Torts - Accountants\u27 Liability - An Independent Auditor Who Furnishes a Financial Statement Owes a Duty to All Those Whom the Auditor Should Reasonably Foresee as Recipients of that Opinion, One Who Is Not in Privity with the Auditor but Who Relies on Such Statements May Recover in Negligence by Post, Benjamin A.
Volume 29 Issue 2 Article 7 
1983 
Torts - Accountants' Liability - An Independent Auditor Who 
Furnishes a Financial Statement Owes a Duty to All Those Whom 
the Auditor Should Reasonably Foresee as Recipients of that 
Opinion, One Who Is Not in Privity with the Auditor but Who Relies 
on Such Statements May Recover in Negligence 
Benjamin A. Post 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Benjamin A. Post, Torts - Accountants' Liability - An Independent Auditor Who Furnishes a Financial 
Statement Owes a Duty to All Those Whom the Auditor Should Reasonably Foresee as Recipients of that 
Opinion, One Who Is Not in Privity with the Auditor but Who Relies on Such Statements May Recover in 
Negligence, 29 Vill. L. Rev. 563 (1983). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss2/7 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
1983-84]
TORTS--AccOUNTANTS' LIABILITY-AN INDEPENDENT AUDITOR WHO
FURNISHES A FINANCIAL STATEMENT OWES A DUTY TO ALL THOSE
WHOM THE AUDITOR SHOULD REASONABLY FORESEE AS RECIPIENTS OF
THAT OPINION; ONE WHO IS NOT IN PRIVITY WITH THE AUDITOR BUT
WHO RELIES ON SUCH STATEMENTS MAY RECOVER IN NEGLIGENCE
Rosenblum v. Adler (N.J. 1983)
From 1969 through 1972, the accounting firm of Touche Ross & Co.
(Touche) prepared audited financial statements for Giant Stores Corpora-
tion (Giant).I Relying on the accuracy of these audits, Harry and Barry Ro-
senblum sold their business to Giant in exchange for shares of Giant
common stock.2 However, the stock transferred to the Rosenblums proved to
be worthless after it was discovered that Giant had fraudulently manipu-
lated its books. 3 When Giant subsequently filed a bankruptcy petition in
1973, the Rosenblums brought an action against Touche alleging, inter ah'a,
that the accounting firm had been negligent in failing to uncover Giant's
fraud when it audited Giant's books for the years ending January 30, 1971
and January 29, 1972.
4
1. Rosenblum v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 329,461 A.2d 138, 140 (1983). Giant was a
Massachusetts corporation which operated discount department stores and various
other shops. Id. at 329-30, 461 A.2d at 140. In 1969, Giant made its first public
offering of common stock pursuant to a registration statement filed with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC). Id. As a publicly traded entity, Giant was
required to file audited financial statements with the SEC as part of its annual report
to stockholders. Id To this end, Grant hired Touche Ross & Co. to conduct its audit
examinations for the fiscal years 1969 through 1972. Id.
2. Id. at 330, 461 A.2d at 141. In November 1971, Giant began negotiating with
the Rosenblums to acquire their businesses in New Jersey, which were known as H.
Rosenblum and Summit Promotions, Inc. Id The Rosenblums' businesses consisted
of retail catalog showrooms in Summit and Wayne, New Jersey. Id. The negotia-
tions culminated in a merger agreement on March 9, 1982. Id During the negotia-
tions, Giant made a public offering of 360,000 shares of its common stock. Id
Accompanying that offering were financial statements of annual earnings which had
been audited by Touche. Id.
3. Id at 331, 461 A.2d at 141. Giant falsely recorded assets that it did not own
and omitted substantial amounts of accounts payable. Id. Thus, the financial infor-
mation that Touche certified in the 1971 and 1972 audits was incorrect. Id. After
the fraud was uncovered in the early months of 1973, trading in Giant stock on the
American Stock Exchange was halted and never resumed. Id. On May 22, 1973,
Touche withdrew its audit for the year ending January 29, 1973. Id.
4. Id at 331-32, 461 A.2d at 141. The plaintiffs' complaint, based on the au-
dited financial statements for the years ending January 30, 1971 and January 29,
1972, consisted of four theories of liability: fraudulent misrepresentation, gross negli-
gence, negligence, and breach of warranty. Id. at 332, 461 A.2d at 141. Plaintiffs
alleged that Touche's negligence was the proximate cause of their loss. Id at 329, 461
A.2d at 140. Touche attached an opinion letter to all of the financial statements
which it had prepared for Giant which stated that it had examined both the state-
ments of earnings and the balance sheets "in accordance with generally accepted
(563)
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The trial court granted Touche's motion for partial summary judgment
with respect to the 1971 financial statements, but denied it with respect to
the 1972 financial statements.5 On appeal, the Appellate Division of the
New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the negli-
gence claim predicated on the 1971 audit.6 The Supreme Court of New
Jersey 7 reversed the decision of the superior court granting defendant's mo-
tion for partial summary judgment with respect to the 1971 audit,8 and af-
firmed its denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect
to the 1972 financial statements,9 holding that an independent auditor who
furnishes a financial statement owes a duty to all those whom the auditor
should reasonably foresee as recipients of that opinion, and that one who is
not in privity with the auditor but who relies on such statements may re-
cover in negligence. Rosenblum v. Ad/er, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
The role of the independent accountant is to scrutinize any financial
statements which a business has prepared and wishes to have reviewed.' 0
Originally, accountants performed this function primarily to inform man-
agement of inefficiencies and irregularities in a business. 'I However, as busi-
auditing standards" and that the financial statements "present[ed] fairly" Giant's
financial position. Id at 330, 461 A.2d at 141. Touche not only asserted in its opin-
ion letters that Giant's financial position was stable, but, at one of the merger negoti-
ations, a partner at Touche stated that it was going to be "a very strong year for
Giant stores [and] it is probably going to be the best in history. ... Id at 330-3 1,
461 A.2d at 441. The plaintiffs alleged that they entered into the merger agreement
in reliance upon the defendant's express representations and consequently suffered
damages. Id at 356, 461 A.2d at 155. Touche responded to plaintiff's complaint by
moving for partial summary judgment. Id. at 330-31, 461 A.2d at 141. Touche
sought to have the court dismiss the negligence claim based on the January 30, 1971
audit, and also the negligence, gross negligence and fraud claims based on the Janu-
ary 29, 1982 audit. Id at 330-31, 461 A.2d at 141-42. With respect to the 1971 audit,
Touche argued that its accountants were not aware of the existence of the plaintiffs
or a limited class to which the plaintiffs belonged at the time the audit was prepared;
thus, Touche reasoned, there was no basis for liability. Id. at 353, 461 A.2d at 154.
With respect to the 1972 audit, Touche maintained that at the time the audit was
issued in April 1972, the plaintiffs had already signed the agreement and were thus
bound to the merger contract. Id at 356-57, 461 A.2d at 155. Hence, the defendants
argued that there could be no causal relationship between their alleged negligence in
preparing the 1972 audit and the plaintiffs' damages. Id at 357, 461 A.2d at 155.
5. Id at 332, 461 A.2d at 142.
6. 183 N.J. Super. 417, 444 A.2d 66 (1982).
7. Justice Schreiber delivered the opinion of the court, and was joined by Chief
Justice Wilentz and Justices Clifford, Handler, Pollock, O'Hern, and Garibaldi.
8. 93 N.J. at 332, 461 A.2d at 142.
9. Id. The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted plaintiffs' motion for leave to
appeal. 91 N.J. 191, 450 A.2d 527 (1982). The defendants also had moved for leave
to appeal from the denial of their motion for partial summary judgment as to the
1972 audits. 93 N.J. at 332, 461 A.2d at 142. The supreme court granted the defend-
ants' motion after it had granted plaintiffs' motion for leave to appeal. Id
10. COMMISSION ON AUDITORS' RESPONSIBILITIES, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, REPORT, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS 1 (1978).
11. See Comment, Auditors' Responsibi/'ty for Misrepresentation.- Inadequate Protectton
for Users of FnacialStatements, 44 WASH. L. REV. 139 (1968). The author points out
[Vol. 29: p. 563
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ness enterprises developed a need for capital beyond what the owner or
owners could supply, banks and other lenders began to call upon auditors for
independent opinions as to the accuracy of financial statements prepared by
loan applicants.12 Moreover, as public ownership of stock continued to in-
crease, investors also looked to the accountant for accurate information. '3 As
a result, it is well recognized today that the accountant's audit is prepared
primarily for the benefit of third parties who have no contractual relation-
ship with the auditor. 4
that originally, the "primary purpose of the audit was to enable the owner-managers
to detect employee fraud and irregularity." Id at 178.
The earliest decision in the United States on accountants' liability was issued by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 A. 783
(1919). In Landel, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an accountant's duty
of care is coextensive with his contractual obligation; hence, an individual could not
sue an accountant for negligently preparing an audit upon which he relied. Id
12. See Wyatt, Auditors' Responsibhiities, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 331 (1968). The
greater responsibility caused by credit needs had a considerable impact on the ac-
counting profession. Id at 333. Accountants now had a consumer for their audits in
addition to their direct clients. Id Since a banker is usually not as informed on the
financial matters being reported as is the direct client, the banker relies upon the
auditor's report as a substitute for his own understanding of his borrower's financial
status. Id
13. Id. Although credit needs provided an impetus to the growth of public ac-
counting in the early 1900's, the needs of investors have, in more recent years, exerted
an even greater influence. Id See Mess, Accountants and the Common Law" Liability to
Third Parties, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 838 (1977). The author points out that "[t]he
central premise of the traditional common law liability as defined in Ultramares-that
the accountants' report is primarily for the benefit of the management-has been
increasingly challenged with the growth of public ownership of stock and the rise of
the consumer movement." Id at 840 (citing Ultramares v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170,
174 N.E. 441 (1931)).
14. See Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants' Responsibilities to Third Parties, 28
VAND. L. REV. 31 (1975). The accountant is not only required to exercise the degree
of skill and care that is common to most professions, he is also required to exercise a
unique attribute, that of independence. Id at 45. Public confidence in the indepen-
dence of auditors is essential. Id
The standard of the profession for independence is "whether reasonable men,
having knowledge of all the facts and taking into consideration normal strength of
character and normal behavior under the circumstances, would conclude that a spec-
ified relationship between a CPA and a client poses an unacceptable threat to the
CPA's integrity or objectivity." 2 AICPA, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS: CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS ET, § 52.09 (1974).
See also I AICPA, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AU, § 110.01 (1972). The Ameri-
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) publishes "Statements on Ac-
counting Standards" which reflect the accountant's responsibility to the public. The
reporting standards provide as follows:
1. The report shall state whether the financial statements are presented in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
2. The report shall state whether such principles have been consistently
observed in the current period in relation to the preceding period.
3. Informative disclosures in the financial statements are to be regarded as
reasonably adequate unless otherwise stated in the report.
4. The report shall either contain an expression of opinion regarding the
financial statements, taken as a whole, or an assertion to the effect that
an opinion cannot be expressed. When an overall opinion cannot be
1983-84]
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With the expanding role of accountants, the pressure to expand the lia-
bility of auditors for their negligence has been increasing. 15 However, courts
have historically been reluctant to provide a cause of action to third parties
who are not in a privity relationship with an accountant.1 6 Some courts have
disregarded the privity requirement and imposed liability only where the
elements of fraud were proven.17 Other courts, however, have extended lia-
bility beyond fraud, and have allowed non-privy parties to recover for the
accountant's gross negligence. 18
expressed, the reasons therefore should be stated. In all cases where an
auditor's name is associated with financial statements, the report should
contain a clear-cut indication of the character of the auditor's examina-
tion, if any, and the degree of responsibility he is taking.
Id. AU, § 150.02. See also 2 CCH AICPA, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS: CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, ET § 51.04 (1982). The ethical code of the American Insti-
tute of Certified Public Accountants recognizes its duty to the public:
The ethical code of the American Institute emphasizes the profession's re-
sponsibility to the public, a responsibility that has grown as the number of
investors has grown, as the relationship between corporate managers and
stockholders has become more impersonal and as government increasingly
relies on accounting information.
Id. For an insurance plan for accountants currently sponsored by the AICPA, see
Rollins, Burdick & Hunter, The AICPA Professional Liability Insurance Program (1976).
15. See Comment, supra note 11, at 177-78. The author notes that as the owner-
ship and management of businesses became more and more detached, the function of
the audit changed from simply being a watchdog for management to providing to
shareholders, creditors, and others an independent evaluation of the accuracy of fi-
nancial statements issued by management. Id. at 178. The author thus maintains
that the imposition of a duty of reasonable care only in favor of the accountant's
client is not a sufficient standard of liability. Id at 178-79.
16. Privity is defined as "a connection between parties (as to some particular
transaction)." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1805 (16th ed.
1971).
17. Where an accountant's actions satisfy the elements of actionable fraud,
courts have imposed liability absent privity. See, e.g., Stephens Indus. v. Haskins &
Sells, 438 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971) (noting in dicta that a cause of action for fraud or
misrepresentation will lie absent privity); O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.)
(accounting firm held liable for fraud to corporate investors who had relied on corpo-
rate balance sheet to their detriment), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 758 (1937); Investment
Corp. of Florida v. Buchman, 208 So. 2d 291 (Fla. App.) (alleged fact that account-
ants were negligent in preparing statement with knowledge that it would be relied
upon by purchaser of stock did not render accountants liable when corporation failed
financially), cert. dismissed, 216 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1968); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Ather-
ton, 47 N.M. 443, 144 P.2d 157 (1943) (accounting firm owed duty to all persons to
whom they knew, or reasonably should have known financial reports would be
shown, to make such reports without fraud).
18. A number of courts have held that where an accountant's acts constitute
gross negligence, there is an inference of fraud upon which a recovery might be based
in favor of a relying third party with whom the accountant is not in privity of con-
tract. See, e.g., Canaveral Capital Corp. v. Bruce, 214 So. 2d 505 (Fla. App. 1968)
(gross negligence, instead of merely raising an inference of fraud, was sufficient
ground on which to base recovery); Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 285 App. Div.
867, 131 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1965), motion denied, 132 N.Y.S.2d 51 (motion to retax plain-
tiffs' costs and disbursements so as to include $338.25 paid by plaintiffs for stenogra-
phers' minutes of the trial and to retax the costs of the defendants by striking them
[Vol. 29: p. 563
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In the 1931 decision of Ultramares v. Touche, 19 the New York Court of
Appeals directly confronted the issue of an accountant's liability to parties
with whom they are not in privity. Speaking for the court, Chief Judge
Cardozo expressed the concern that a removal of the privity barrier would
extend an accountant's liability to an indeterminate class of litigants. 20
Since the number of third parties who could foreseeably rely on an account-
out, in all respects denied), aj'd, 285 App. Div. 869, 137 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1955) (due to
gross negligence, accountant held liable in fraud to a shareholder who had purchased
stock in reliance upon a statement of adjustments prepared by the accountant); State
St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938) (accountant's failure to
verify company's true financial status constituted gross negligence raising an infer-
ence of fraud).
For a historical perspective on the use of gross negligence as an inference of
fraud, see Marinelli, The Expanding Scope of Accountants' Liabiity to Third Parties, 23
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 113, 116 (1971) (although common law allowed an action
against an accountant only where there was proof of fraud, the courts gradually
"found themselves softening the harshness of this rule in specific cases by the factual
finding that the negligence was 'gross negligence' or 'recklessness' sufficient to support
an action in the nature of fraud" and consequently, "the laws of fraud and negligent
misrepresentation have become inextricably entangled").
19. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). In Ultramares, the defendants, Touche,
Niven & Co., were employed by Fred Stern & Co., Inc. (Stern & Co.), to prepare and
certify a balance sheet exhibiting the condition of its business. Id. at 173, 174 N.E. at
442. The plaintiff, a corporation engaged in business as a factor, relied on the de-
fendants' balance sheet in loaning money to Stern & Co. to finance the company's
sales of rubber. Id. at 175, 174 N.E. at 443. Prior to contracting with Stern & Co.,
the defendants knew that Stern & Co. had borrowed large sums of money from banks
and other lenders and that the balance sheet which the defendants prepared would
be exhibited by Stern & Co. to bankers, creditors, stockholders and purchasers. Id at
173, 174 N.E. at 442. However, the defendants had no knowledge of the number of
transactions in which the balance sheet would be used. Id at 174, 174 N.E. at 442.
Moreover, the defendants did not know that the particular plaintiff in Ultramares
would extend credit to Stern & Co. Id. When the defendants failed to discover that
Stern & Co. had fraudulently manipulated its books and filed for bankruptcy, the
plaintiff sued the defendants. Id. at 176, 174 N.E. at 443. Since the plaintiffs were
members of an indeterminate class of persons who could have dealt with Stern & Co.
in reliance upon the audit, Judge Cardozo held that plaintiffs could not bring a cause
of action against Touche. Id. at 183, 174 N.E. at 446.
For a discussion of the Ultramares decision and its progeny, see Solomon, Ul-
tramares Revisited: A Modem Study of Accountants' Liability to the Pubhc, 18 DE PAUL L.
REV. 56 (1968).
20. 255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444. With respect to the scope of an account-
ant's duty, Chief Judge Cardozo said,
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to
detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose
accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate
amount of time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business con-
ducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw
may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to these
consequences.
Id. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444.
For a criticism of Chief Judge Cardozo's theory that expanded liability will im-
pose an undue burden on the accounting profession, see Professional Liablty'-A New
Development, 99 N.J.LJ. 356 (1976). The author maintains that an expansion of lia-
bility to reasonably foreseeable third parties will not impose the unmanageable expo-
1983-84]
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ant's statement seemed unlimited, Chief Judge Cardozo urged that the im-
position of a negligence standard would impose an undue burden on the
accounting profession.
21
Although Chief Judge Cardozo in part based his decision on this con-
cern, he took pains to distinguish his earlier opinion in Glanzer V. Shepard,22 a
case which did not involve accountants' liability. In Glanzer, public weighers
who were employed by a seller of beans were held liable to a buyer despite
an absence of privity.23 Judge Cardozo distinguished this from the situation
in U/tramares by maintaining that the service performed by the defendants in
Glanzer was primarily for the benefit of a specifically foreseen third party.2
4
Thus, although many courts have relied on Ultramares to bar all negligence
actions against accountants where a privity relationship did not exist, 2 5
sure feared by Chief Judge Cardozo because reliance and causation are still necessary
elements in a common law action. Id
21. 255 N.Y.2d at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 445.
22. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
23. Id at 239, 135 N.E. at 276. In Glanzer, the defendants were public weighers
who certified the weight of a quantity of beans for the purpose of setting a contract
price. Id at 238, 135 N.E. at 275. The defendants supplied a weight certificate to the
purchaser of the beans who paid accordingly, but later found that the weight had
been overstated. Id The purchasers sued the defendants to recover the excess price.
Id at 237-38, 135 N.E. at 175. Although Judge Cardozo recognized the lack of
contractual privity between the parties, he nevertheless held the defendants liable.
Id at 238-39, 135 N.E. at 275-76. Judge Cardozo concluded that the duty of care
owed by the defendants was not limited to those in privity with the defendants, but
was also owed to any specific party who would foreseeably rely on the information
stated in the certification. Id Since the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's certifi-
cation was, to the weighers' knowledge, the "end and aim of the transaction," the
duty of care was extended to the plaintiffs. Id.
For cases which have followed the Glanzer rationale in extending the duty of care
owed by accountants, see Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968)
(accountant held liable to actually foreseen party); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l
Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yarner & Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972) (since the
accounting firm knew a particular bank sought financial statements to determine
whether to issue loans, accountants owed duty of care to bank); Ryan v. Kanne, 170
N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969) (since the accountant knew of both the purpose of his finan-
cial statement and the specific party to whom the statement would be shown, lack of
privity was no defense); White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d 315, 401
N.Y.S.2d 474 (1977) (scope of liability extended to those whom the accountant must
have known would rely on the financial statements); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v.
James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (because the accountants knew that
their audit reports would be provided to, and relied upon by, a particular creditor,
lack of privity was not a defense); Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah
1974).
24. 255 N.Y. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 446. The U//ramares court distinguished
Glanzer on the grounds that the service rendered by the defendant in that case was
primarily for the benefit of a specific third person, whereas the service in Ultramares
was rendered primarily for the benefit of the Stern Co. and only incidentally for
those to whom Stern might subsequently show the balance sheet. Id
25. The following cases illustrate the traditional view that the scope of an ac-
countant's liability for negligence in the preparation of financial statements is limited
by the contract. In each case, the court denied recovery to a third-party plaintiff
despite actual reliance on the accountant's statements. See, e.g., Stephens Indus. v.
[Vol. 29: p. 563
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Chief Judge Cardozo's opinion would allow liability to attach where a party
not in privity with an accountant was specifically foreseen by the accountant
as the primary beneficiary of his statement.
26
The gradual undermining of the privity requirement in other areas of
the law has led to a general pressure towards abolishing the privity require-
ment as a prerequisite to accountants' liability. In particular, the law of
products liability has witnessed a slow, but definite removal of the privity
requirement. In the nineteenth century, the encouragement of the growth of
industry led to a concomitant desire to avoid burdening new manufacturers
with extensive liability for defects in their products. 2 7 The doctrine of priv-
ity was employed to limit that liability to those who expressly contracted
with the manufacturer for the purchase and sale of one of their products. 28
However, as industry grew in size and sophistication, the fear of overly bur-
densome liability began to diminish while the protection of consumers
emerged as a dominant policy concern. 29 Finally, in the 1962 decision of
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. ,30 the California Supreme Court held
that privity was no longer a requirement in warranty actions and announced
the doctrine of strict liability in tort. 31 The great majority of courts in other
Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971) (applying Colorado law) (rejecting the
argument that a public accountant may be held liable to third parties whom the
accountant knows will be relying on the audit); Investment Corp. of Fla. v. Buch-
man, 208 So. 2d 291 (Fla. App.) (accountant may not be held liable in negligence in
the preparation of a certified financial statement to a third party not in privity with
the accountant), cert. dismi sed, 216 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1968).
26. Viewed in light of Glanzer, the Ultramares decision does not stand for the
proposition that there can be no third-party negligence liability for accountants.
Rather, such liability exists where the certification is for the primary benefit of a
specifically foreseen third party; that is, where "[t]he bond is so close as to approach
that of privity, if not completely one with it." 255 N.Y. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 446.
For a further discussion of Glanzer, see notes 22 & 23 and accompanying text infra.
For an article which questions the continuing viability of the Ultramares doctrine, see
Wiener, Common Law Liability of the Certiied Public Accountant for Negligent Misrepresenta-
tion, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 233, 237 (1983) (author notes that contrary to the con-
cern expressed by Judge Cardozo, there is no empirical data to suggest that the
accounting profession has suffered as a result of increased liability but to the con-
trary, accounting as a business is prospering).
27. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 642 (4th ed.
1971).
28. See Comment, Accountants' Liabil'ty for Neghgence-A Contemporary Approach for
a Modern Profession, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 401 (1979) (pointing out that since indus-
trial growth was a favored policy, the potential for forcing a manufacturer into bank-
ruptcy was considered to outweigh the desire to compensate every injured consumer).
29. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). In
MacPherson, Judge Cardozo abandoned the privity requirement in tort actions by
holding that a manufacturer has a duty to exercise reasonable care in avoiding inju-
ries arising out of manufacturing defects. Id at 389-90, 111 N.E. at 1053.
30. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
31. Id at 63, 337 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 201. The Yuba court stated:
Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the theory
of an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the
plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a contract between them,
the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed
1983-84]
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jurisdictions have subsequently followed the Yuba decision and have simi-
larly abandoned the privity requirement in products liability actions.
3 2
With the removal of the privity requirement in other areas of the law
such as products liability, several courts and commentators have recognized
the need for the imposition of a greater duty of care and have consequently
extended an accountant's liability in negligence to certain classes of plaintiffs
who were not in privity with the accountant.3 3 A non-privity plaintiff was
first allowed to bring an action against an accountant on the basis of ordi-
by law. . . and the refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the scope
of its own responsibility for defective products . . . make clear that the lia-
bility is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law
of strict liability in tort.
Id. See also Besser, rviO.?-An Obsolete Approach to the Liabihty of Accountants to Third
Parties, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 507 (1976). Besser notes that despite the willingness
of courts to extend liability to parties not in privity where there have been personal
injuries or injuries to tangible interests, there is reluctance where negligent misrepre-
sentation has resulted solely in pecuniary loss. This reluctance can be attributed to
the courts' fears of opening the door to "unlimited liability" to an "indeterminate
class." Besser, supra, at 512.
32. Young v. Up-Right Scaffolds, Inc., 637 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (applying
District of Columbia law); Daleiden v. Carborundum Co., 438 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir.
1971) (applying Minnesota law); Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir.
1964) (applying New York law); Hacker v. Rector, 250 F. Supp. 300 (W.D. Mo.
1966) (applying Missouri law); Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D.
Ind. 1965) (applying Indiana law); Casrell v. Altec Indus., 335 So. 2d 128 (Ala. 1976);
Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970); Nalbandian v. Byron Jackson
Pumps, 97 Ariz. 280, 399 P.2d 681 (1965); Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216
A.2d 189 (1965); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Parzini v.
Center Chemical Co., 134 Ga. App. 414, 214 S.E.2d 700 (1975); Stewart v. Budget
Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Hawaii 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970); Shields v. Morton Chemical
Co., 95 Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857 (1974); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 I11. 2d 612,
210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d
672 (Iowa 1970); Brooks v. Dietz, 218 Kan. 698, 545 P.2d 1104 (1976); Dealers Trans-
port Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965); Spillers v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 282 So. 2d 546 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Phipps v. General Motors Corp.,
278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85,
133 N.W.2d 129 (1965); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967); Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.,
162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973); Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 191
N.W.2d 601 (1971); Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439, 420
P.2d 855 (1966); Santor v. A&M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965);
Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111 (1969); Stang v.
Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972); Onzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 1
Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E.2d 92, aft, 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1965);
Cochran v. Brooke, 243 Or. 89, 409 P.2d 904 (1966); Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220
A.2d 853 (1966); Ritter v. Narragansett Electric Co., 283 A.2d 255 (R.I. 1921); Ford
Motor Co. v. London, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966); Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co.
v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601
P.2d 152 (Utah 1979); Zaleskie v. Joyce, 133 Vt. 150, 333 A.2d 110 (1975); Palmer v.
Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970); Morningstar v. Black
& Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979).
33. See Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968); Frischer v.
Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa
1969); Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. 1973);
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nary negligence in Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin .31 In Rusch, the United States
District Court for the District of Rhode Island held that a single party whose
reliance had been actually foreseen by the defendant-accountant could bring
a cause of action against that accountant. 35 At the core of the Rusch decision
is a fundamental rejection of Chief Judge Cardozo's social utility rationale in
U/tramares.36 Whereas Chief Judge Cardozo cautioned against an overly-
broad class of potential litigants, the Rusch court maintained that the risk of
loss is more fairly distributed by imposing it on the accounting profession
rather than on an innocent, reliant party.
37
In developing its own analysis, the Rusch court relied upon Judge Car-
dozo's opinion in Glanzer v. Shepard,38 the decision involving public weighers
which Chief Judge Cardozo had distinguished in Ultramares. Chief Judge
Cardozo, writing for the court in Ultramares, had found Glanzer inapposite
because the Ultramares plaintiffs' reliance had not been specifically foreseen
White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d 315, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1977); Milli-
ner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974).
For the views of a commentator who asserts that the liability of the accountant
should be extended beyond privity, see Comment, supra note 28, at 421. The author
asserts that although accountants may have needed the protection of privity to insu-
late them from third-party liability when Ultramares was decided, accounting has be-
come a far more sophisticated profession which has eliminated the oversights that
were common 50 years ago. Id (citing Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 180, 174 N.E. at 445).
The author maintains that those who rely on an accountant's negligently-prepared
audits should be compensated for their injuries. Id.
34. 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968) (applying Rhode Island law).
35. Id at 91. Although the plaintiff in Rusch had been actually foreseen by the
defendant-accountant, the court in dictum maintained that an accountant "should
be liable in negligence for careless financial misrepresentations relied upon by actu-
ally foreseen and limited classes of persons." Id at 93. The court further maintained
that it would "not rule upon, but leav[e] open for reconsideration in the light of trial
development, the question of whether an accountant's liability for negligent misrep-
resentation ought to extend to the full limits of foreseeability." Id. In Rusch, a lender
loaned the accountant's client a sum in excess of $337,000 in reliance upon financial
statements prepared by the accountant. Id. at 86-87. When the accountant's client
went into receivership, the lender sued the accountant for damages. Id. at 87. The
accountant moved to dismiss the action, in part because there was no privity of con-
tract. Id Although the Rusch court acknowledged that there was no precedent
which would permit a plaintiff not in privity to sue an accountant, the court never-
theless questioned the wisdom of the Ultramares decision and its progeny. Id at 90-91.
For a discussion of the Rusch court's response to Uliramares, see notes 36 & 37 and
accompanying text hfra.
36. 284 F. Supp. at 90-91. The court questioned why the heavy burden of an
accountant's professional malpractice should be imposed on an innocent reliant
party. Id at 91. The court maintained that the risk of loss is more fairly distributed
by imposing it on accountants, who can pass insurance costs on to their customers,
who in turn can pass the cost on to the consuming public. Id
37. Id The Rusch court also maintained that a negligence standard would cause
accountants to be more cautious in their audits. Id. The court supported its analysis
by describing a recent case which had held that accountants may have a common
law duty to disclose to investors and lenders the discovery of misstatements in their
already circulated financial statements. Id (citing Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180
(S.D.N.Y. 1967)).
38. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
1983-84]
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by the defendant-accountants. 39 Since the plaintiff in Rusch was a single
party whose reliance was actually foreseen by the defendant, the court held
that the facts of Rusch were analogous to those in Glanzer and thus held that
liability should be imposed.40
While the decisions in Rusch and Glanzer extended liability for negligent
acts only to specifically foreseeable plaintiffs, the Second Restatement of
Torts takes a somewhat broader view towards accountants' liability. The
Restatement would impose liability for harm to unknown members of a spe-
cifically foreseen class.4 1 Although some courts continue to maintain the re-
quirement of privity,42 those which have rejected privity in favor of a
foreseeability standard have split on whether to apply the Restatement's for-
mulation or to limit the liability of accountants to speciicaly foreseen third
parties.43 Under yet a third view, in an effort to impose a greater duty with-
out creating an undue burden on the profession, 4 4 some courts have em-
39. 255 N.Y. at 182, 174 N.E. at 445. In Ultramares, Judge Cardozo distin-
guished Glanzer by maintaining that in the latter case, the defendant-public weighers
knew that their weight certificate would be relied upon by the particular plaintiff.
Id. In contrast, Judge Cardozo argued that the plaintiff in Ultramares was one of an
"indeterminate class of persons" who could have relied on the defendant-account-
ants' audit. Id. at 182-83, 174 N.E. at 446.
40. 284 F. Supp. at 91-92.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). Section 522(2)(a) pro-
vides as follows:
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1)
is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose bene-
fit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that
the recipient intends to supply it; ....
Id.
Comment (h) of the explanatory notes pertaining to Section 552 provides than
an accountant's liability to non-privity parties is not limited to a specifically foreseen
plaintiff:
Under this Section, . it is not necessary that the maker should have
any particular person in mind as the intended, or even the probable, recipi-
ent of the information . . . . It is sufficient, in other words, insofar as the
plaintiff's identity is concerned that the maker knows that the maker sup-
plies the information for repetition to a certain group or class of persons and
that the plaintiff proves to be one of them, even though the maker never
had heard of him by name when the information was given.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment h (1977).
42. See, e.g., Stephens Indus., v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971)
(although recognizing Rusch and its progeny as a developing trend, refusing to depart
from the Ultramares doctrine and denying recovery in the case of a specifically fore-
seen third party).
43. See, e.g., Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 70 Ohio St. 2d 154,
436 N.E.2d 212 (1982) ("[a]n accountant may be held liable by a third party for
professional negligence when that third party is a member of a limited class whose
reliance on the accountant's representation is specifically foreseen"); Milliner v. El-
mer Fox and Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974) (rejecting the privity requirement, but
unwilling to hold the accountants liable to contemplated, but not specifically fore-
seen, third parties).
44. It has been suggested that U/iramares no longer responds to the realities of
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ployed a balancing of interests approach to be used on a case-by-case basis. 45
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has also recognized
the need to extend the liability of accountants to those not in privity. The
increasing public ownership of stock and the widespread use of accounting
statements by stock purchasers have led the SEC to provide a direct cause of
action against accountants under certain circumstances. 46 Two federal se-
curities laws subject accountants to liability to third parties.4 7 Section 11 of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 193348 was designed to ensure compli-
ance with the disclosure requirements of the Act by subjecting those parties
who play a direct role in a registered offering to a strict standard of liabil-
the accounting profession vis-a-vis the accountant's duty to the public. See Besser,
supra note 31, at 531-32. Besser states that:
The role of the accountant in the normal functioning of business has been
expanding significantly since 1931 when Judge Cardozo was able to declare
that public accountants were only "public" to the extent that they held
themselves out to the public for hire but in no sense owed a duty to the
public. Whereas at one time an audit was performed primarily for the pur-
pose of informing management of possible defalcations and irregularities in
its business, the reality now is that "the principal effects of the auditor's
opinion to management is to meet the requirements of, and influence the
actions of, third parties with whom the auditor has no contract."
Id. (citations omitted). The accounting profession has also acknowledged the impor-
tance of the accountant's duty of impartiality and independence from the client. For
excerpts from the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Code
of Professional Ethics, and Professional Standards, see note 14 supra. See also In re
Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629, 670 (1957) ("[t]he responsibility of a
public accountant is not only to the client who pays his fee, but also to investors,
creditors and others who may rely on the financial statements which he certifies").
45. See Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d
Cir. 1961). In Brown, the district court stated that in determining whether an ac-
countant owes a duty to a plaintiff not in privity, courts should balance the following
considerations: "[t]he relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendants, the na-
ture of the defendants' participation in the challenged transactions, and the plain-
tiffs' reliance upon the defendants' acts. ... Id at 230. For a further discussion of
this balancing approach, see Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 979 (1972). See also Aluma Kraft
Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox and Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. App. 1973). In Aluma Krafi,
the Missouri Court of Appeals held that an accountant will be liable to third parties
when he "knows the recipient intends to supply the information [contained in the
audit] to prospective users," and set forth factors to be weighed in each case to deter-
mine the liability of accountants to these third parties. Id at 383. The court main-
tained that the following factors should be weighed in every case to determine
whether an accountant should be held liable to a third party: "(1) the extent to
which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the foresecability of
harm to him; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury and (4) the
closeness of the connection between defendant's conduct and the injury suffered." Id
46. The Securities Act of 1933 requires that prospectuses filed with respect to
public offerings of securities be accompanied by certified financial statements. 15
U.S.C. §§ 7 7g, aa (1982). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires that in-
dependent certified financial statements be included in annual reports, which must
be filed by virtually all companies having assets of at least $3,000,000 and 500 holders
of a class of equity securities. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-4
(1983).
47. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 78r (1982).
48. Id. § 77k(a).
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ity.4 9 Under Section 11, a purchaser of a registered security need only show
a material misstatement or omission in an accountant's financial statement
to establish a prima facie case.5 ° Even if a misstatement is innocent, liability
is virtually absolute. 51
Under section 18 of the Act, an accountant who causes a misleading
statement to be made in any report filed with the SEC is subjected to civil
liability. 52 In order to bring a cause of action under section 18, the plaintiff
49. See generally Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683, 687 (1983),
on remand, 705 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1983).
50. An action under § 11 can be brought only against the issuer, its directors or
partners, underwriters, or accountants who have prepared or certified the financial
statement. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). In determining whether an accountant has con-
ducted a reasonable investigation or whether he has a reasonable ground for belief
under § 11, "the standard of reasonableness shall be that required of a prudent man
in the management of his own property." Id § 77k(c). The measure of damages
under § 11 shall be
the difference between the amount paid for the security (not exceeding the
price at which the security was offered to the public) and (1) the value
thereof as of the time such suit was brought, or (2) the price at which such
security shall have been disposed of in the market before suit, or (3) the
price at which such security shall have been disposed of after suit but before
judgment if such damages shall be less than the damages representing the
difference between the amount paid for the security (not exceeding the
price at which the security was offered to the public) and the value thereof
as of the time such suit was brought ....
Id. § 77k(e). The maximum amount recoverable under § 11 shall not be greater than
the price at which the security was offered to the public. Id § 77k(g). Any person
who becomes liable under this section may recover contribution from one who could
also be held liable under § 11. Id § 77k(o.
In determining what constitutes a material misstatement, most courts adopt a
standard similar to that enunciated by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp.
643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In Escolt, Judge McLean stated,
The average prudent investor is not concerned with minor inaccuracies
or with errors as to matters which are of no interest to him. The facts which
tend to deter him from purchasing a security are facts which have an im-
portant bearing upon the nature or condition of the issuing corporation or
its business.
Id at 681.
51. There are, however, three defenses to liability under § 11. Liability will not
be imposed if the accountant can prove the following: (1) he had ceased acting as
accountant before the effective date of registration, and that he had informed the
Securities Exchange Commission of that fact; (2) part of the registration statement
became effective without his knowledge, and that he had informed the Commission
of that fact; or (3) after reasonable investigation, the accountant had reasonable
grounds to believe, and in fact did believe, that the statements contained in the regis-
tration were true and not misleading. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(l)-(3) (1982). The burden
of proof is on the accountant to prove either freedom from negligence or due dili-
gence. Id § 77k(b).
See Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 575
(E.D.N.Y. 1971) (although asserting that § II creates almost absolute liability in the
issuer, pointing out that the section does provide all defendants with the affirmative
defense that the plaintiff knew of the omission).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1982).
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must not only prove that the accountant made a misstatement and that the
misstatement related to a material fact, he must prove that he read the filed
document or relied on a repetition of the statement. 53 Moreover, the plain-
tiff has the burden of proving that the price of the security was affected by
the misstatement. 54 If a plaintiff is able to prove these elements, the defend-
ant can avoid liability if he can prove "that he acted in good faith and had
no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading."'55
Although sections 11 and 18 of the Securities and Exchange Act expose
accountants to liability, the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder56 quashed the possibility that a plaintiff might use the anti-fraud
provisions of the federal securities laws to impose civil liability on an ac-
countant for innocent misstatements not contained in a document filed with
the SEC. In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court held that mere negligence will
not subject an accountant to liability under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 or SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 57 Since
Hochfelder eliminated the possibility of bringing a federal action under sec-
tion lOb-5 in the absence of fraud, many potential creditors and investors
have looked to the state courts to expand the liability of accountants. 58
53. Id § 78r(a). See H. BLOOMENTHAL, 1982 SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 184
(1982). See also Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968) (reliance by plaintiff
required in action brought under § 18).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1982). As § 18 states, an accountant shall be liable to
"any person (not knowing that such statement was false or misleading) who, in reli-
ance upon such statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a price which
was affected by such statement, for damages caused by such reliance .. " Id. See
L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1752 (1961).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1982). The statute of limitations governing causes of
action arising under § 18 requires that the action be brought within one year after
the discovery of the fact giving rise to the cause of action and within three years after
such cause of action accrued. Id. § 78r(c).
56. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
57. Id at 200-01. The action in Hlochfelder was brought under § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-
5. Id. at 187-88 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) and 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1983)).
The plaintiffs in Hochfelder were victims of a fraudulent securities scheme perpetrated
by the president of a brokerage firm. Id. at 189. Plaintiffs brought a cause of action
in negligence against the accounting firm which had audited the brokerage firm. Id
at 190. However, the Supreme Court held that mere negligence will not subject an
accountant to liability under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. Id at 200-01.
The Supreme Court held that an action under § 10(b) and S.E.C. Rule lOb-5 re-
quires a demonstration of scienter or fraud. Id
58. See Rosenblum v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983). Hochfelder has
raised more questions than it has answered and its ultimate impact is uncertain. See
Dondanville, Defending Accountants' Liability: Trends and Implications, 15 FORUM 1, 73
(1979). The author points out that, since Hochfelder, it is not clear whether reckless
conduct can support an imposition of liability under Rule lOb-5. Id. at 188. The
author notes that several courts of appeals have since held that recklessness would
satisfy the scienter requirement in some circumstances. Id. (citing Rolfv. Blyth, East-
man Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535
F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976); Hoffman v. Estabrook & Co., Inc., 587 F.2d 509 (1st Cir.
1978); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332 (1st Cir. 1978)). The author contends that
"[flor accountants, these decisions appear to dampen the Hochfelder victory." Id at
1983-84]
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Against this background, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered
whether an accountant who audits a company's financial statements should
be held liable to all those who may foreseeably rely on that statement when
the audit has been performed negligently. 59 The Rosenblum court prefaced
its analysis by noting that an action against an accountant is predicated
upon the accountant's representations. 60 Therefore, although Rosenblum's
claim was in the nature of a malpractice action, the court characterized it as
one grounded in negligent misrepresentation. 6' The court also acknowl-
edged that, in actions brought against accountants in other jurisdictions,
privity or a privity-like relationship between the claimant and the negligent
actor is generally required.
62
189. See also Besser, supra note 31, at 509. ("with the range of federal actions now
limited by Hochfe/der, and the rationale for seeking pendent federal jurisdiction thus
eliminated, a rebirth of state actions and accentuated drives to expand the account-
ant's common law liability under traditional negligence can be anticipated"). For a
case decided since Hochfelder in which a complaint was dismissed due to plaintiff's
failure to plead fraud with particularity, see Jacobson v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co., 445 F. Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). For cases decided since Hlochfelder in which
accountants were found liable under the scienter requirement, see Herzfeld v.
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976) (materially
misleading omissions); McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976) (ma-
terially misleading omissions), rev'd, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979). For a state
supreme court decision decided since Hlochfelder which has applied a negligence stan-
dard to accountants' liability, see Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113
Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983). In Ct izens State Bank, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin held that a reasonably foreseeable standard will keep the cost of credit
down, because relying third parties will not have to suffer losses resulting from negli-
gently prepared audits. Id. at 384, 335 N.W.2d at 365. The court also pointed out
that the foreseeability standard will make accountants more diligent in preparing
financial statements for their clients. Id
59. 93 N.J. at 329, 461 A.2d at 140.
60. Id. at 333, 461 A.2d at 142. The Rosenblum court asserted that although the
theory advanced by the plaintiffs dealt with the service performed by accountants
and is therefore in the nature of malpractice, the plaintiffs' claim could also be
viewed as based upon negligent misrepresentation. Id
61. Id
62. Id. at 335, 461 A.2d at 144. The Rosenblum court noted that the oldest case
to deal with accountants' liability in the United States is a Pennsylvania decision
which held that an accountant was not liable for misstatements in a company's au-
dits to a third person who had relied on the audits and purchased the company's
stock. Id at 337, 461 A.2d at 144 (citing Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 A. 783
(1919)). The court also noted that the leading opinion on accountants' liability is
that of Chief Judge Cardozo in Ultramares. Id (citing Ultramares v. Touche, 255
N.Y. at 170, 174 N.E. at 441). The court explained that Ultramares permitted the
existence of a duty only to the person for whose "primary benefit" the audits were
intended. Id. at 338, 461 A.2d at 145. Finally, the court noted that § 552 of the
Second Restatement of Torts limits the persons to whom an accountant owes a duty
to intended, identified beneficiaries and to any unidentified members of the intended
class of beneficiaries. Id The court concluded that the only way in which the Re-
statement extends the liability of accountants beyond the holding in Ultramares is that
the accountant need not know the identity of the plaintiff if he belongs to an identi-
fied group which was intended to receive the accountant's statements. Id. For the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding in Landell, see note 11 supra. For a discussion
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The Rosenblum court began its analysis by observing that the function of
an independent auditor is to examine and review a company's financial
statements and to issue an opinion as to the accuracy of those statements.
63
After acknowledging that an accountant's opinion is commonly distributed
by the company to potential stockholders, investors and creditors, the court
sought to decide whether such parties can bring a cause of action against an
accountant when they rely upon a negligently-prepared report.64 In order to
determine whether to limit the liability of accountants in New Jersey to cases
where the parties are in a privity relationship, the Rosenblum court pursued a
two-part analysis. First, the court examined whether, in other areas of the
law, an action for negligent misrepresentation may be maintained for eco-
nomic loss despite the absence of privity.65 Second, the Rosenblum court
sought to determine what duty should be imposed on the accountant to best
serve the public interest.
66
In examining negligent misrepresentation actions in other areas of the
law, the court recognized that there has been a split as to whether privity or
a similar relationship is required in an action against the supplier of a service
for negligent misrepresentation resulting in economic loss.6 7 However, de-
spite this split in authority, the court maintained that the area of products
liability is particularly instructive in determining whether to impose a re-
quirement of privity in actions against accountants. 68 As the court pointed
out, negligent misrepresentations about products may be the basis for liabil-
of the facts and holding in Ultramares, see notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra.
For the text of the Restatement, see note 41 supra.
63. 93 N.J. at 332, 461 A.2d at 142.
64. Id.
65. Id at 334-41, 461 A.2d at 142-47. The Rosenblum court first looked at
whether privity or a similar relationship is required in a suit against the supplier of a
service for negligent misrepresentation causing economic loss. Id at 335-39, 461 A.2d
at 143-45. The court then looked at whether privity is required in products liability
actions. Id at 339-41, 461 A.2d 145-46.
66. Id. at 341-53, 461 A.2d at 147-53.
67. Id. at 335, 461 A.2d at 143. The court noted that actions based on a negli-
gent misrepresentation which have resulted in physical injury are generally permitted
despite an absence of privity. Id. The court, however, observed that the New Jersey
courts have split on the issue of whether privity or a similar relationship is required in
a suit against the supplier of a service for negligent misrepresentation causing eco-
nomic loss. Id at 335-36, 461 A.2d at 143-44 (citing Commercial Union Ins. Co. v.
Thomas-Aitken Constr. Co., 54 N.J. 76, 253 A.2d 469 (1969); Kahl v. Love, 37 N.J.L.
5 (1873); Gold Mills, Inc. v. Orbit Processing Corp., 121 N.J. Super. 370, 297 A.2d
203 (Law Div. 1972); Immerman v. Ostertag, 83 N.J. Super. 364, 199 A.2d 869 (Law
Div. 1964)).
68. Id. at 339, 461 A.2d 145-47. The Rosenblum court noted that negligent mis-
representations dealing with products may be the basis of liability irrespective of
privity and that such liability has not been limited to physical injuries. Id, 461 A.2d
at 146 (citing Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 136 A.2d 626 (1957); O'Donnell v.
Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 13 N.J. 319, 99 A.2d 577 (1953); Martin v. Studebaker
Corp., 102 N.J.L. 612, 133 A. 384 (N.J. Err. & App. 1926); MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916)).
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ity even in the absence of privity. 69 Thus, even though products liability
actions involve the liability of a manufacturer rather than the supplier of a
service, the Rosenblum court relied on this area of the law to support its
analysis.
70
The Rosenblum court further maintained that unless some policy consid-
eration dictates otherwise, privity should not define the boundaries of a duty
of care. 71 Instead, the court asserted that the reasonably foreseeable conse-
quences of a negligent act should define the duty.72 Although the court rec-
ognized that the primary objection to imposing on accountants a duty to
third parties is that accounting firms would be unable to survive the losses
resulting from lawsuits against them,73 the court maintained that such a
public policy concern is unwarranted.
74
The Rosenblum court offered several reasons in support of this position.
First, the court asserted that since accountants have been able to afford lia-
bility insurance covering their present risks, there is no reason to believe that
they will be unable to obtain insurance covering their negligent acts. 75 In
addition, the court suggested that the imposition of a duty to foreseeable
users might cause accountants to perform more thorough reviews, thereby
decreasing the number of instances in which liability would be imposed.
76
The court further asserted that the financial exposure resulting from
69. Id at 340, 461 A.2d at 146. The Rosenblum court, in drawing an analogy
between products liability actions and other types of actions based on negligent mis-
representations, stressed that privity should not be required in either cause of action:
Why should a claim of negligent misrepresentation be barred in the
absence of privity when no such limit is imposed where the plaintiff's claim
also sounds in tort, but is based on liability for defects in products arising
out of a negligent misrepresentation? If recovery for defective products
may include economic loss, why should such loss not be compensable if
caused by negligent misrepresentation?
Id. at 341, 461 A.2d at 147.
70. Id
71. Id at 338, 461 A.2d at 145.
72. Id
73. Id. at 348, 461 A.2d at 151. According to the court, it is thought that the
costs of imposing a duty to third parties will be so severe that accounting firms will be
unable to absorb the losses, particularly given the fact that audited clients will often
be judgment proof or unable to satisfy their share of the indebtedness. Id.
74. Id at 348-49, 461 A.2d at 151-52.
75. Id at 348, 461 A.2d at 151. The court noted that accountants have been
able to obtain insurance covering their liabilities under the securities laws. Id at 349
n.ll, 461 A.2d at 151 n. 11. The court further pointed out that a survey taken by the
Practicing Law Institute revealed that accounting firms have little trouble obtaining
insurance at a reasonable cost. Id
76. Id. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152. The Rosenblum court posited that the imposition
of a negligence standard might lead accounting firms to set up stricter standards and
employ closer supervision, which would consequently reduce the number of times
that liability would be imposed. Id. Although the court admitted that accountants
might incur additional costs as a result of more thorough review and increased insur-
ance premiums, the court maintained that these additional costs would be absorbed
by the business entity and its stockholders or its customers. Id
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negligence liability has certain built-in limits. 77 As the court pointed out,
plaintiffs must prove that they relied on the accountant's statements and
that the auditor's negligence was the proximate cause of their damages.7 8
The court also noted that an accounting firm could seek indemnification and
contribution from a blameworthy client.
7 9
By examining the changing role of accountants in our economy, the
court provided additional support for its decision to impose a negligence
standard on the profession. The court stressed that although the account-
ant's audit was, at one time, used primarily to inform management of ineffi-
ciencies in the business, it is well-recognized today that audits are designed
to be used by third parties who are not in privity with the accountant.8 0 As
the court observed, this role of the audit is reflected in the securities laws
which presently hold accountants liable to stock purchasers when they mis-
state a material fact in their statements.8 '
77. Id
78. Id The court also asserted that the plaintiffs in an action against an ac-
countant would have to prove that they received audited statements from a company
for a proper business purpose. Id Moreover, the "injured party would be limited to
recovery of actual losses due to reliance on the misstatement." Id
79. Id at 351, 461 A.2d at 152. The court also pointed out that negligence on
the part of an injured party could bar or limit the amount of recovery under the
Comparative Negligence Act. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West 1982)).
Moreover, the court noted that accountants have the ability to put disclaimers in
their contracts. Id As the Rosenblum court pointed out, some commentators have
maintained that a "factor which may limit the foresight of reasonable reliance is the
presence of a disclaimer of responsibility attached to the information." Id (quoting
Stanton & Dugdale, Recent Developments in Professional Neghence-I: Accountant's La-
bihty to Third Parties, 132 NEW L.J. 5 (1982)).
80. Id. at 346, 461 A.2d at 149. The Rosenblum court described the function of
the accountant in our economy before discussing whether a duty to foreseeable users
would serve the public interest. Id. at 342-47, 461 A.2d at 147-50. The court pointed
out that the role of the accountant is to scrutinize the financial records of a com-
pany's management. Id. at 343, 461 A.2d at 148. The court also noted that although
at one time the audit was primarily prepared to inform management of problems or
inefficiencies in its business, "it is now well recognized that the audited statements are
made for the use of third parties who have no contractual relationship with the audi-
tor." Id. at 345, 461 A.2d at 149. The court also noted that the accountant is ex-
pected to be independent and thus should report the facts whether they are favorable
or unfavorable to the client. Id. at 347, 461 A.2d at 150. The court further asserted
that an accountant has a moral responsibility, and under the securities laws, a legal
and financial responsibility, to be as aware of the interests of strangers who may rely
on his opinion as of the client who pays his fee. Id at 345, 461 A.2d at 149 (quoting
In re Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629, 670 (1957)).
81. Id. at 348-49, 461 A.2d at 151. The Rosenblum court asserted that account-
ants are presently liable to purchasers of securities in public offerings when they have
misstated a material fact in the financial statements. Id. at 348, 461 A.2d at 151
(citing Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982)). The court also emphasized
that, under § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, an action for accountants' liability is
often available where an action for ordinary negligence would not lie. Id Under§ 11, the plaintiff does not have the burden of proving negligence, but rather has the
burden of proving that he was not negligent. Id (citing Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1973). The court further noted that § 18 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 creates a civil liability in which privity is no defense. Id
1983-84)
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In examining whether the imposition of a duty to foreseeable users
would best serve the public interest, the Rosenblum court balanced the inter-
ests of an accountant who negligently prepares a financial statement against
the interests of a party who is injured through reliance upon that state-
ment.8 2 The court maintained that the imposition of a duty to foreseeable
users will serve the public interest since it will shift the risk of loss from the
innocent investor or creditor to the individual who is responsible for the
loss.8 3 The Rosenblum court thus held that when an independent auditor pro-
vides an opinion with no limitation as to whom the company may dissemi-
nate the financial statements, he has a duty to all those whom that auditor
should reasonably have foreseen as recipients for proper business purposes of
the statements, provided that the recipients relied on the statements for those
purposes.
84
It is submitted that the Rosenblum court's imposition of a duty to all
foreseeable users of an independent auditor's statements is justified given the
current role of the accounting profession in our economy. In light of the
changes which have taken place in the accounting profession in recent years,
the privity requirement of Ultramares is no longer an appropriate boundary
in defining the scope of an accountant's liability.8" Although the account-
ant's primary responsibility in the past was to report on the inefficiencies of a
business to a company's management, it is well recognized today that the
accountant's audits are prepared largely for the benefit of third-party
users. 86 Since the negligence of accountants threatens an ever-increasing
However, it pointed out that a plaintiff pursuing such an action must prove that the
defendant's action was fraudulent. Id The court finally noted that even under the
Ultramares holding, accounting firms are liable, despite an absence of privity, to all
third persons for fraud and gross negligence. Id at 349, 461 A.2d at 151.
82. Id at 351, 461 A.2d at 152.
83. Id The Rosenblum court maintained that the injured party should be able to
recover damages from an independent auditor whose negligence brought about these
damages. Id. Moreover, the court emphasized that since a broader duty will en-
courage accountants to exercise greater diligence, instances of negligence will be
greatly reduced. Id The court asserted that civil liability is one of the best incentives
for a profession to partake in greater self-regulation. Id (quoting Comment, Auditors'
Responsibih'tyfor Misrepresentation: Inadequate Protectionfor Users of Financial Statements, 44
WASH. L. REV. 139, 177 (1968)).
84. Id. at 352, 461 A.2d at 153.
85. See Mess, supra note 13, at 857.
86. See Besser, supra note 31, at 541-42. As the author asserts,
The demands of a consumer oriented economy, governmental regulation,
constantly shifting and more complicated taxes and tax regulations, en-
forcement of federal and state securities statutes aimed at fully informing
the potential investor, intricate corporate mergers and acquisitions, all have
thrust duties upon the accountant, expanded his engagement and compli-
cated his work far beyond what might have been regarded as mere book-
keeping duties 45 years ago.
Id
It is important to note that the accounting profession has recognized that its role
in the investment industry creates a duty to the public. Indeed, the accountant's
audit is relied upon by the public in its evaluation of a company's financial stability.
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number of private investors, the liability of accountants should be expanded
to protect these third parties.
The accounting profession itself has recognized this responsibility to the
public.8 7 As stated in the ethical code of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA), the profession's responsibility to the public
has grown as the number of investors has grown and as the relationship be-
tween shareholders and corporate directors has become more detached.8 8 It
is submitted that the liability of accountants should be expanded to reflect
this changing role.8 9
In order to determine the extent of that liability, resort must be made to
other areas of professional negligence. 90 It is imperative to underscore the
principal objective in every area of professional negligence: to shift the risk
of loss from the innocent-and-injured party to the party who is responsible
for the loss. 9 1 Since today's accountants are aware that third parties will rely
upon their financial statements, any loss resulting from their negligence
should be borne by them.
Although the primary objection to imposing a foreseeability standard
See SEC Accounting Series Release No. 105, In re Homer E. Kerlin (1966), reprinted
in 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,127, at 62,678 (1970) ("A public accountant's
examination is intended to be an independent check upon management's account of
its stewardship. Thus he ha[s] a direct and unavoidable responsibility of his own,
particularly where his engagement relates to a company which makes filings with the
Commission or in which there is a substantial public interest").
87. See 1 AICPA, supra note 14, § 110.01.
88. See 2 AICPA, supra note 14, ET, § 51.04.
89. If the CPA's liability is not expanded to reflect his increasingly public role,
the risk of loss will remain on the public rather than on the accountant. Since the
public relies on the accountant's audits in deciding whether to invest in a particular
company, the accountant should be held liable when an innocent third party relies
on a negligently prepared audit. Otherwise, the innocent third party will have to
bear a loss that is completely attributable to the accountant's negligence. See Com-
ment, supra note 28, at 414-416.
90. For cases that apply a negligence standard to other professions, see United
States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979) (applying negligence standard to physicians);
Maggiapinto v. Reichman, 607 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying negligence stan-
dard to dentists); Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher and Associates, 24 Utah 2d 172, 467
P.2d 610 (1970) (applying negligence standard to architects); Mant v. Gillespie, 189
N.J. Super. 368, 460 A.2d 172 (1983) (applying negligence standard to attorneys).
91. See Wiener, supra note 26, at 253. The author states that public policy sug-
gests that the risk of loss should be imposed on the party best able to prevent its
occurrence. Id. Further, he emphasizes that although the Ultramares holding was
based on the assumption that dismal economic consequences would ensue if account-
ing firms owed a duty to third parties, this argument has been given short shrift by
the courts in other areas and "[c]urrent literature contains no reasons nor do any
come to mind to support singling out the accounting profession for this type of prefer-
ential treatment." Id at 252. See also Marinelli, supra note 18, at 139. Marinelli
emphasizes that since the audits which the independent accountant prepares and
certifies are relied upon by investors and creditors as representing the true financial
condition of the accountant's client, the accountant has the duty as a party with
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on accountants is that accounting firms will subsequently be liable to a great
number of creditors and investors, it is submitted that such a concern is un-
warranted.92 As the Rosenblum court emphasized, the difficult burden of
proof imposed on a plaintiff in a negligent misrepresentation action against
an accountant significantly diminishes the risk of unlimited liability.9 3 Spe-
cifically, the requisite proof of reliance will tend to reduce the chances for
successful litigation, since in the usual commercial transaction, the creditor
or investor relies on many factors other than an accountant's financial
statements.
94
The present ability of accounting firms to obtain adequate insurance
coverage also lessens the fear that the profession will be unable to cope with
expanded liability. 95 Although it is argued that expanded liability will lead
to premium increases and to the inevitable cancellation of insurance policies,
it is suggested that this concern is unfounded. The Supreme Court's holding
in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,96 in which federal actions under Rule 10b-5
against accountants were limited to actions in fraud,9 7 and the difficulty of
92. See Besser, supra note 31, at 537-41. The author contends that the potential
for unlimited liability is substantially diminished by the problems of proof that are
present in a suit against an accountant. Id. at 537. The plaintiff in such a suit must
not only prove justifiable reliance but also that the misrepresentation caused the spe-
cific injuries suffered by the plaintiff. Id. at 538.
93. 93 N.J. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152. The Rosenblum court emphasized that a
plaintiff in a lawsuit against an accountant would have to prove that he received the
accountant's audit from a company for a proper company purpose, that he relied on
the accountant's misstatements, that the misstatements were due to the accountant's
negligence, and that the misstatements were a proximate cause of the plaintiff's dam-
age. Id
94. See Arofessional Liabih'ty-A New Development, supra note 20, at 356. The au-
thor demonstrates how the difficulty of proving reliance will significantly limit the
liability of accountants:
In the typical commercial transaction, the creditor or investor parting
with his money often relies on many factors other than a financial state-
ment or legal opinion proffered by the other side. Many investors do not
bother with an audit at all, but accept contractual representations and war-
ranties. Others bring in their own accountants and lawyers (with whom, of
course, they are in direct privity) to conduct the necessary investigations on
which they rely.
Id
95. See Rollins, Burdick & Hunter, supra note 14.
The AICPA currently sponsors an insurance program which offers high limits to
both large and small firms. The effectiveness of the AICPA plan is evidenced by its
endorsement by many state CPA societies and its widespread subscription. The pro-
visions of the AICPA plan include the following: (1) coverage for all claims, includ-
ing all costs of legal defense, except those involving intentional fraud; (2) coverage
limits up to $10 million; (3) policies which last three years and have annual premi-
ums; and (4) a wide range of deductibles for firms with a staff size between one and
250 members.
96. 425 U.S. at 185. For a discussion of the effects of the fochfelder decision on
accountants' liability actions under Rule lOb-5, see Besser, supra note 31, at 508-09.
97. 425 U.S. at 185. The Hochfelder case required that the plaintiff prove scien-
ter, a mental state involving the intent to defraud. Id For a discussion of Hochfelder,
see notes 56-57 and accompanying text supra.
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proving the elements in any common-law action against an accountant, will
serve to prevent an unmanageable expansion of liability. Moreover, the
ability of accountants to seek indemnification and contribution from a
fraudulent client should further serve to curtail liability. 98
Although the Rosenblum court provided strong support for its conclusion,
it is submitted that the court's reliance on products liability cases which have
disposed of the privity requirement is somewhat misplaced. 99 In essence, the
fact that products liability involves the sale of a product, while accountants'
liability involves a service, makes it difficult to analogize these two areas of
the law.' 00 While the efficiency and safety of a product can readily be
tested, there are many variables in accountants' liability-such as a client's
fraud-which are more difficult to control.' 0 1 It is submitted that instead of
analogizing accountants' liability to products liability, the court would have
provided a far more fitting illustration if it had drawn from other areas of
professional negligence, such as the law of legal malpractice. 10 2
Although the Rosenblum court correctly held that a negligence standard
should be applied to accountant's liability, the court can also be criticized
for not articulating the manner in which foreseeable plaintiffs are to be de-
termined.' 0 3 In order to provide guidance to the application of the reason-
ably foreseeable standard, it is suggested that courts should follow a sliding-
scale approach to foreseeability.10 4 In essence, such an approach would fo-
98. 93 N.J. at 351, 461 A.2d at 152. See also Wiener, supra note 26, at 258. Wie-
ner asserts that although accountants have a right of indemnification and contribu-
tion against a fraudulent client, an imposition of liability on the negligent accountant
would be justified even where the client has become insolvent, since the risk of loss
must be shifted from the innocent injured party to the party at fault. Id
99. 93 N.J. at 339-41, 461 A.2d at 145-47.
100. For a discussion of the gradual undermining of the privity requirement in
the area of products liability, see notes 27-32 and accompanying text supra.
101. For the Rosenblum court's discussion of the law of products liability, see
notes 68-70 and accompanying text supra.
102. For the views of a commentator who has analogized accountants' liability
to attorney malpractice, see Wiener, supra note 26, at 252. The author points out that
the fear of indeterminate liability has been given short shrift in other areas such as
legal malpractice. Id
103. For a discussion of the Rosenblum court's reasons for imposing a negligence
standard, see notes 75-83 and accompanying text supra.
104. The author would like to credit Professor Ellen Wertheimer, of the Villa-
nova University School of Law, for suggesting the concept of a sliding-scale ap-
proach. Essentially, the sliding-scale approach would involve a two-part analysis.
First, a court applying this approach would focus on the activity that an accountant
is hired to perform for his client and would determine whether that activity is in-
tended to affect any parties not in privity. Second, if it is determined that the activ-
ity is intended to affect parties not in privity, the court would determine how broad a
segment of the public was involved in the activity. If a party not in privity who
relied on an accountant's negligently prepared work-product belonged to that seg-
ment of the population, that party would be permitted to bring a cause of action
against the accountant.
For the views of a commentator who has indicated the need to apply an ap-
proach which looks to whether an accountant-client transaction is public or private,
see Fiflis, supra note 14, at 110. As the author asserted:
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cus on the private or public nature of an accountant-client transaction in
determining how far the duty to third parties extends.
0 5
In employing this sliding-scale approach, courts should examine the ac-
tivity performed by an accountant for his client and then determine where it
falls on a scale between "extremely private" and "extremely public" transac-
tions.10 6 While an activity that involved an "extremely private" purpose
would give rise to no third-party liability, an activity involving an "ex-
tremely public" purpose would give rise to extensive third-party liability. i07
To illustrate, if an accountant were hired to perform a function that was
solely to benefit his client-such as reporting to the client on inefficiencies in
its business-the accountant would not be liable to any third parties who
subsequently relied on the information provided in those reports. Con-
versely, if both the accountant and his client knew that financial statements
prepared by the accountant could be relied upon by third parties, the ac-
countant would be held liable to any third party who relied on those
statements. 108
In one case the audit may be of a closely held company for use in making a
new public offering, or in another case, for reporting to the existing man-
agement. One would not be offended in the former case with a finding of
liability to the investors despite the absence of privity, whereas in the sec-
ond case imposition of liability for loss in an unintended transaction would
be unthinkable.
Id.
105. It is important to note how cases decided under the privity doctrine would
be decided under the "sliding scale" approach. For example, in Ultramares, the de-
fendant-accounting firm knew that the plaintiff intended to use statements prepared
by the firm to borrow large sums of money from banks and other lenders. 255 N.Y.
at 183, 184 N.E. at 442. However, even though the Ultramares court stated in dicta
that a party not in privity who was specifically foreseen by an accountant would be
permitted to bring a cause of action, the court denied plaintiff the right to sue the
defendant since the plaintiff had not been specifically foreseen. Id. at 179-84, 174 N.E.
at 444-47.
It is submitted that under the "sliding scale" approach suggested here such an
unjustifiable result would be avoided. Since the plaintiff in Ultramares belonged to
that segment of the public which the defendant knew would rely on its statements,
the plaintiff would be entitled to sue the accounting firm for negligence.
106. If an accountant performs a function that is considered "extremely pri-
vate," it is a function which will only be used by his client. In other words, it is only
foreseeable that the client will rely on the accountant's work product. However, if an
accountant's function falls on the "extremely public" end of the spectrum, the ac-
countant will owe a duty to parties not in privity.
107. It is submitted that in order to employ the foreseeability standard to its
maximum fairness, a duty to parties not in privity should not be imposed where the
accountant believes that his work product will only be used by his client. Where an
accountant performs a function that is solely to benefit his client, it is submitted that
it is not reasonably foreseeable that third parties will rely on his work product.
108. In order to fully demonstrate the benefits of the reasonably foreseeable
standard along with the "sliding scale" approach suggested here, it is necessary to
compare this hybrid standard with the two other tests of foreseeability that have been
advanced in response to accountants' liability, namely, the "specifically foreseen"
theory and the Second Restatement's theory of accountants' liability. It is submitted
that unlike the reasonably foreseeable standard, both of these standards involve un-
justifiable limits on liability. For courts which have limited the liability of account-
ants to specifically foreseen third parties, see note 43 and accompanying text supra.
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It is submitted that because the public nature of an accountant-client
transaction would dictate whether a particular third-party claimant could
bring a cause of action, the sliding-scale approach would provide courts with
an accurate means of applying the reasonably foreseeable standard.' 0 9 Fur-
thermore, this approach would allow accountants to predict whether they
may be held liable to third parties prior to contracting with a client." 0 It is
thus suggested that the general duty enunciated by the Rosenblum court can
be made a fully-workable standard through the use of this sliding-scale
approach.
In analyzing the impact which will result from the Rosenblum decision, it
For a discussion of the Restatement's approach, see note 41 and accompanying text
supra.
Under the "specifically foreseen" approach, a party not in privity can only re-
cover against an accountant if reliance by that third party had been actualy foreseen
by the accountant. For example, if a client informs his accountant that he will use
the accountant's audit to obtain a loan from The Blackacre National Bank, Black-
acre will be permitted to sue the accountant if the audit is negligently prepared.
However, if the client is unable to get credit from Blackacre and instead obtains a
loan from The Greenacre National Bank, Greenacre will not be allowed to sue the
accountant since it had not been specifically foreseen. It is submitted that an ap-
proach which draws such arbitrary and unjustifiable boundaries between liability
and non-liability should not be imposed.
It is further suggested that the application of the Restatement's theory of ac-
countants' liability would lead to an equally unjustifiable scope of liability. Under
the Restatement's approach, liability should not only be extended to specifically fore-
seen third parties, but also to unidentified members of an actually foreseen class.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment h (1977). Thus, if an account-
ant knows that his audit will be used to induce an extensive number of third parties
to purchase stock in a corporation, the accountant would be held liable to any pur-
chaser of stock who suffered a loss as a result of relying on his audit. Id. However, if
the client decides to use the accountant's audit for the purpose of borrowing money,
the accountant would be free from liability against any creditor who suffered injury.
Id For a discussion of the Restatement approach, see note 41 and accompanying
text supra.
Thus, like the "specifically foreseen" approach, liability under the Restatement
formulation would depend on whether the party not in privity was a member of an
arbitrarily-fixed class. It is submitted that such arbitrary results could be avoided
through the use of the reasonably foreseeable standard. Under such a standard, once
an accountant puts his financial statement into public circulation for any purpose,
the accountant would not only owe a duty to any purchaser of stock, but also to any
creditor who relied on his statement. Since both purchasers of stock and creditors
have a right to rely on information provided by accountants, it is submitted that such
a result is clearly justified.
109. It must be emphasized that the sliding-scale approach would not replace
the reasonably foreseeable standard. On the contrary, it is merely a means of imple-
menting the foreseeability test.
110. If the accountant performs a function that he knows his client will use vis-
a-vis the public, the accountant will know that he is taking the risk of having an
action brought against him by a party who relied on his statement. The sliding-scale
approach will also allow the accountant to predict whether he will owe a duty to a
narrow or broad segment of the public, since the extent to which an accountant-
client transaction is public will dictate whether a particular third-party claimant can
bring a cause of action. For a discussion of the sliding scale approach, see notes 104-
07 and accompanying text supra.
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is important to consider the relationship between the Rosenblum holding and
the liability imposed under the Securities Acts. As a result of the Rosenblum
decision, a plaintiff who is injured by an accountant's negligently prepared
registration statement can bring a cause of action either in federal court
under the securities laws or in the New Jersey state court system.1 11 In fact,
the Rosenblum court may have attempted to impose a standard of liability
similar to that imposed by section 11 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1933.112
Despite this similarity, it is submitted that the Rosenblum decision is
nonetheless necessary. Although the stock purchaser who is injured by an
accountant's negligence may already have an avenue of recovery under the
securities laws, the Rosenblum holding provides a multitude of other potential
claimants with a means of recovering against the accountant. Since other
types of creditors and investors commonly rely on the accountant's audit, the
liability of accountants should be expanded to allow those creditors and in-
vestors to recover against a negligent accountant.1 1 3 In conclusion, it is thus
submitted that the duty imposed by the Rosenblum court analyzed in terms of
the sliding scale approach suggested here, will improve the accounting pro-
fession by encouraging a higher level of diligence and, consequently, benefit
the public at large.
Benjamin A. Post
111. For a discussion of an accountant's liability under the securities laws, see
notes 46-58 and accompanying text supra.
112. Section 11 requires a finding that the accountant did not act with due
diligence and that the plaintiff purchased stock pursuant to a registration statement.
15 U.S.C. 77k(b) (1982). It is submitted that this is quite similar to the Rosenblum
decision which requires a finding that the accountant committed negligence and that
the plaintiff relied on his audit pursuant to a proper business purpose. 93 N.J. at 352-
53, 461 A.2d at 153. As the Rosenblum court held:
When the independent auditor furnishes an opinion with no limitation in
the certificate as to whom the company may disseminate the financial state-
ments, he has a duty to all those whom that auditor should reasonably fore-
see as recipients from the company of the statements for its proper business
purposes, provided that the recipients rely on the statements pursuant to
those business purposes.
Id.
113. See Comment, supra note 28, at 413. As the author asserts, "The account-
ant's professional opinion is the only means available to prospective investors and
creditors to evaluate their potential risk in terms of the current financial posture of
the company." Id
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